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COMMENT
Limitation of Liability Clauses in Public
Utility Tariffs: Is the Rationale for State-
Sponsored Indemnity Still Valid?
JOHN L. RUDYt
INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of public utility companies,
1 limitation
of liability provisions2 for interruptions of service
3 resulting
t Editor-in-Chief, Buffalo Law Review, 2004-2005; J.D. Candidate, 
State
University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2005; B.A. Emory University,
2001. The author thanks Professor James A. Wooten for his 
critical review of
and careful suggestions on preliminary drafts of this comment. The 
author also
thanks his father, John A. Rudy, for his help in developing 
the topic and
shaping the form of this comment. The staff of the Buffalo 
Law Review
contributed invaluable editing support; any errors that remain are, of course,
my own.
1. For the purposes of this comment, the term "public utility companies" 
is
synonymous with "electric utility companies." "Electric utility 
companies" are
"any company which owns or operates facilities used for the generation,
transmission, or distribution of electric energy for sale ... ." 
Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUHCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(3) 
(1996). In
contrast, the term "electric company" is used to differentiate electricity 
supply
companies from electric utility companies in a deregulated market.
2. Limitation of liability provisions typically limit the liability exposure 
of
an electric utility company or an electric company for interruptions 
of service to
instances of willful negligence or wanton misconduct. See, 
e.g., Tariff of
Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., Original Leaf No. 62-A (July 
30, 2000),
available at http://www.pulp.tc/ConEdTariff8-19-0
3 .pdf (last visited Dec. 10,
2004); see also infra note 10.
3. An "interruption" arises after five minutes of lack of service. 
See N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 97.1(a) (2003).
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from ordinary negligence have been accepted as necessary,
appropriate, and legitimate.4 Although deregulation has
fundamentally reconfigured the markets in different utility
industries,5 regulators have not yet questioned the validity
of limitation of liability clauses. In fact, the rationale for
promoting competition in utility industries' conflicts with
the rationale for imposing regulation.7 Nonetheless, limita-
tion of liability provisions have remained an accepted
element of the tariffs8 filed with public service commis-
sions.' The widespread blackout of August 14, 2003, and the
4. See Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894); Weld v. Postal Tel.
Co., 210 N.Y. 59 (1913); Re Liab. Clauses in Rate Schedules of Gas and Elec.
Corps., 26 Pub. Util. Rep. (N.S.) (PUR) 373 (N.Y.P.S.C. Nov. 30, 1938);
Application of Cent. Power and Light Co. for Approval of Tariff Amendment
Application of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. for Approval of Tariff Amendment,
Docket Nos. 3198 and 3234, 7 Tex. P.U.C. Bull. 53, 1981 WL 178870 (1981).
5. The trend toward industry deregulation began in the 1970s with common
carriers (airlines, railroads, and trucking companies), whereas the
telecommunications and electric industries have been deregulated only recently.
See Alfred E. Kahn, Competition in the Elec. Industry Is Inevitable and
Desireable, in THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 22-24 (Pub. Util. Rep. &
N.Y.S. Energy Research & Dev. Auth. 1994). This may be due to the unique and
ethereal nature of the services they provide. See Paul L. Joskow, Elec. Sector
Restructuring and Competition: Lessons Learned, 40 LATIN AM. J. ECON. 548,
551 (December 2003) ("Electricity has an unusual set of physical and economic
attributes . . ").
6. Competition was introduced to the utility sector primarily to reduce rates
and remove inefficiencies created by the public utility structure. See discussion
and notes infra, Part I(D).
7. The bases for regulating public utilities included quality and continuity of
service, and were less concerned with rates. See discussion and notes infra, Part
I(B).
8. The utility's tariff is the contract that establishes the rates and rules that
govern the relationship between the utility and its customers. The state public
service commission "negotiates" the terms of the tariff on behalf of the
customers. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM., A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED BY UTILITIES
AND THEIR REGULATORS (N.Y. P.S.C. Jan. 31, 2004), at http://www.dps.state.ny.
us/glossary.html#B (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
9. Public service commissions were the governing bodies of the public utility
sector. In addition to establishing regulations to ensure quality of service, the
commissions had the authority to determine the rate that each utility was
permitted to charge. See discussion infra Part I(B)(2) and note 70. In the
deregulated environment, public service commissions have played a smaller
role, as independent system operators ("ISO"s) have assumed many of their
functions in the electricity market.
At the federal level, tariffs are filed with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC"), previously the Federal Power Commission ("FPC").
FERC has the adjudicatory power to review market structure and market
behavior. Additionally, FERC can set the national policy for wholesale
interstate transmission. See discussion infra Part I(C) and accompanying notes.
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earlier turmoil surrounding the deregulation of California's
energy market highlight the relevance of asking whether, in
a deregulated environment, indemnity by tariff" is still
valid.
As regulators continue to develop electricity markets
that promote competition, the reasoning that guided regu-
lation of utility markets becomes increasingly inappropri-
ate. That is, the state-sponsored incentives that advanced
regulated electric utilities" no longer seem to apply to the
market forces that govern a deregulated market. Conse-
quently, the assumptions that guided regulated utilities
should be re-assessed and altered, if necessary, to support
new market conditions.
This comment reviews the origins of limitation of
liability provisions for negligent interruptions of service in
the regulated electricity sector and considers whether these
rationales are appropriate in a deregulated electricity mar-
ket. In order to understand the need for limited liability in
a regulated market, we first must examine the foundational
aspects of these provisions. By understanding the evolution
of electricity regulation from contract right to full regula-
tion to open competition, we can evaluate whether the
principles of the liability limitations still apply. This com-
ment is not intended to debate either the feasibility or the
desirability of competitive energy markets as opposed to the
monopolies created by regulated utility markets. Although
the analysis necessarily touches on issues pertaining to the
transition between each structure, the focus of this com-
ment is limited to the consideration of limitation of liability
clauses in electricity tariffs.
Part I provides the historical foundation of the treat-
ment of and attitudes toward public utilities throughout
their existence. A review of the historical context in which
10. "Limitation of liability" or "limited liability" clauses are synonymous
with the phrase "indemnity by tariff." That is, the limitation of liability
provisions contained in electric tariffs protect electric companies from liability
for interruptions of service due to ordinary negligence. Essentially, the tariff
acts to cause the customer (who would be the injured party) to hold harmless or
indemnify the electric company. Although indemnity typically identifies a third
party insurer, here, the customer plays the dual role of both the injured party
and the indemnifier.
11. These incentives included, inter alia, fixed rate of return pricing,
"natural monopolies," and limitation of liability.
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limitation of liability clauses arose is critical to determining
the justifications for endorsing indemnity by tariff for neg-
ligence. As part of that review, Part I compares the state
and federal regimes regulating public utilities. Part II as-
sesses the contractual relationships and the assignment of
risk in a deregulated market. Also considered are the rami-
fications of limitation of liability clauses in the development
of a comprehensive competitive electricity market. Part III
analyzes the applicability of the rationale for limitation of
liability provisions in the deregulated environment.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Common Law Origins
At the beginning of the twentieth century, utility con-
tracts were arms-length transactions negotiated between
the company and the buyer. Consequently, the contracts
could be tailored to the demands of every customer. Often,
customers could choose between rates that also determined
liability limits. Courts ratified the terms of the contracts
because the risk was understood to be part of the considera-
tion at formation of the contract.
Limitation of liability first appeared in utility contracts
involving common carriers" and telegraph transmission.
The courts resolved the issue of liability as one of a basic
contract right, to which each party assented." In Hart v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,"4 the United States Supreme
Court held that a common carrier could not limit its liabil-
12. Common carriers were companies engaged in the commercial
transportation of people or property. Common carriers were similar to public
utilities in that they served all persons who requested service, as opposed to
private carriers, which were employed for a particular purpose. See BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 269 (4th ed. 1968). Courts held consistently that common
carriers had a duty of care to their customers that could be limited to the value
of the property transported. See Hart v. Pa. R.R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 343 (1884);
Squire v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 98 Mass. 239, 244-45 (1867) ("The law is now well
settled that, in the absence of any statute upon the subject, common carriers
may by special contract limit their liability, at least against all risks but their
own negligence or misconduct." (citations omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Hart, 112 U.S. at 331 ("damages ... for the breach of a
contract").
14. 112 U.S. 331 (1884).
1382 [Vol. 52
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ity for negligence. 5 The standard that the Court explained
in Hart was based on the relationship between the compa-
nies and their services: the companies were viewed as
serving the public interest as "quasi-public" entities. 6
Plaintiffs argued that the companies owed a basic duty of
care and diligence for which they could not contract-away
liability. 7 Initially, the Supreme Court rejected the distinc-
tion between degrees of negligence: "A failure to exercise
[due] care and diligence is negligence. It needs no epithet
properly and legally to describe it."" Nonetheless, a reason-
15. Id. at 338 (holding that a common carrier "cannot stipulate for
exemption from the consequences of his own negligence or that of his servants")
(citing N.J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344
(1848); York Co. v. Cent. R.R., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 107 (1865); Express Co. v.
Caldwell, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 264 (1874); Ogdensburg & Lake Champlain R.R.
Co. v. Pratt, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 123 (1874); Bank of Ky. v. Adams Express Co.,
93 U.S. 174 (1876); Grand Truck Ry. of Can. v. Stevens, 95 U.S. 655 (1877)).
16. Hart, 112 U.S. at 337-38; see also Weld v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 92 N.E.
415 (N.Y. 1910), rev'd on other grounds, 103 N.E. 957 (N.Y. 1913).
17. See Dorgan v. Tel. Co., 7 F. Cas. 918, 922 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1874) (No.
4,004).
The telegraph company is engaged in a quasi public employment....
Incalculable sums depend upon the alacrity, care, and good faith which
it brings to the discharge of its duties. The whole business of the
commercial world is to a degree dependent upon it. The public has a
right to exact at least ordinary negligence. A common carrier is not
allowed to protect himself by contract from liability for the result of his
own negligence.
Id. at 922.
This rule does not make telegraph companies insurers.... It only
requires the performance of their plain duty. It is no hardship upon
them. They engage in the business voluntarily. They have the entire
control of their servants and instruments. They invite the public to
entrust messages to them for transmission. They may insist on their
compensation in advance. Why, then, should they refuse to perform the
common duty of care and diligence? Why should they make conditions
for such performance?
Hyer v. W. Union Tel. Co., 4 New Eng. Rep. 786-7; see also Brief of Plaintiff in
Error at 14-21, Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co, 154 U.S. 1 (1894) (No. 13,923). In
contrast, the Weld court found that:
The conclusions reached in this case do not tend to subject the public to
the mercy of a telegraph company. While such a corporation is invested
with certain privileges to be exercised by it for the public benefit, its
liability must be measured by reasonable limitations. The opportunity
is afforded to one doing business with it to protect himself from danger
incident to error likely to arise.
103 N.E. at 963.
18. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 383 (1873).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
able limitation of the companies' duty could be stipulated in
the contract.' 9
The familiar holding of Hadley v. Baxendale21 is the
Court of Exchequer's analysis of consequential damages.
Implicit in the Hadley limitation on consequential damages
is the court's finding that lost profits were outside the con-is te rt' fi i  21
sideration of the contract. Yet the Hadley court recognized
the duty of the parties to a contract to perform according to
the contract's terms.22 When applied to the issue of limita-
tion of liability, the Hadley principle turns on the risk that
the parties have contemplated as part of the contract for
service.
In Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,23 the
Supreme Court cited to the Hadley rationale to assert that
a limitation of liability was part of the consideration, in
that neither party was said to have contemplated liability
in the formation of the contract. 4 In this case, involving
telegraph service, the Supreme Court held that a contrac-
tual limitation of liability was not an exemption from
liability for negligence, but merely a requirement on the
part of the customer to pay an additional charge to have his
message repeated. 25 The Primrose Court relied on the New
York Court of Appeals holding in Kiley v. Western Union
Telegraph Co.,26 to assert that telegraph companies may
"protect themselves against liabilities which they would
otherwise incur through the carelessness of their numerous
agents .. ..27
19. See Hart, 112 U.S. at 341; accord Kiley v. W. Union Tel. Co., 16 N.E. 75
(N.Y. 1888); Weld, 103 N.E. at 959.
20. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854).
21. Id. at 151-52.
22. Id. at 151.
23. 154 U.S. 1 (1894).
24. See id. at 29 (Damages should be those which "may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they
made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.") (quoting Hadley,
156 Eng. Rep. at 151) The issue becomes more difficult to determine in the
context of public utilities, where a public service commission stands-in for the
customer in negotiating the contract terms, i.e. the tariff. See supra note 8.
25. Id. at 15.
26. 16 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1888).
27. Primrose, 154 U.S. at 21 (quoting Kiley, 16 N.E. at 76).
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Previously, general corporation laws governed the con-
tractual relationship between the customer and the utility
company.28 The corporate autonomy granted in these laws
placed the companies in a superior bargaining position over
the customer. The general corporation laws permitted busi-
nesses to establish the rules and regulations regarding
their services so long as they did not contravene state or
federal laws.'6 Consequently, the company was authorized
to form the regulations by which it would be governed. °
Thus, the utility company could choose which customers to
serve,31 as well as impose the conditions of the service con-
tract upon those customers. The customers were in no
position to dispute the terms, absent fraud on the part of
the company.
Upon agreement to the stipulations of the contract, rep-
resented by the "blank" used in telegraph transmission or
the ticket used by common carriers the customer was
estopped from disputing the damages. The principle of es-
toppel is similar to the consequences of indemnity by
28. See, e.g., Breese v. U.S. Tel. Co., 48 N.Y. 132, 137 (1871) (Lott, Ch. C.)
(reviewing Ch. 265 of the Laws of 1848).
29. See id., at 137-38 (Lott, Ch. C.) ("There is no limitation or restriction on
their power to make such prudential rules, regulations and by-laws as they may
deem necessary in the transaction of their business, except only that they shall
not be inconsistent with the laws of this State or of the United States.")
(discussing the applicable corporation laws at the time).
30. See id. at 138 (Lott, Ch. C.).
31. See Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Littleton, 77 So. 565, 569
(Ala. 1917) (order on rehearing) ("Even though the business was affected with a
public interest, those engaged therein were not obliged to serve all the public
without discrimination, and may arbitrarily refuse service without assigning
reasons.") (emphasis added) (citing Wyman on Public Service Corps., § 29).
1 32. See Breese, 48 N.Y. at 138 (Lott, Ch. C.) ("Under that general power, the
defendants were authorized to prescribe such regulations as they deemed
necessary to guard against errors or delays in the transmission or delivery of
messages, and to declare that a party who failed to comply therewith should
assume all risks and losses resulting from such errors or delays.").
33. As stated in Breese:
The blanks contained the terms upon which the company solicited and
would accept his business, and when the message was written upon
one of them and brought to the office of the company, its agent had the
right to assume and believe that he accepted the terms, and assented
to and understood the agreement.
Breese, 48 N.Y. at 141 (Earl, C.). See also Hart v. Pa. R.R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 341
(1884); Note, The Effect of Filing a Limitation of Liability Clause with the
Interstate Commerce Commission, 27 HARV. L. REV. 737, 737 (1913-1914).
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tariff-the customer surrenders his right to a cause of
action for negligence.34 In fact, the New York Court of
Appeals, in Breese v. U.S. Telegraph Co.," held that, where
the parties did not use the usual form of contract, repre-
sented by a blank, the customer was presumed to have
assented to the terms of an ordinary blank." In order to un-
derstand why limitation of liability provisions persisted in
forming laws and regulations that would govern utility tar-
iffs, or contracts, directly, we must examine the reasoning
that led to the common law rules expressed above.
The original contract rationale for limited liability
focused on the principles of damages. Liability, represented
by potential damages, was limited and proportionate to the
risk.37 Given the technologically intricate manner in which
telegraph messages were sent-through a series of dots and
dashes-the Supreme Court found it irrational to impose
complete liability on the telegraph company, as the error
(such as one missing dot) should not justify the potential
damage.3"
Similar rationales governed the reasoning in state
courts.39 The New York Court of Appeals in Kiley v. Western
34. See Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 48-55, Boston & Maine R.R. v. Hooker,
233 U.S. 97 (1914) (No. 121).
35. 48 N.Y. 132 (1871).
36. Id. at 141-42 (Earl, C.) (relying on the principle of estoppel in pais, or by
conduct) (citing Lewis v. Great W. Ry. Co., 157 Eng. Rep. 1427 (1860); Grace v.
Adams, 100 Mass. 505 (1868); Wolf v. W. Union Tel. Co., 62 Pa. 83 (1869)).
37. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U.S. 24 (1879).
It is undoubtedly competent for carriers of passengers, by specific
regulations, distinctly brought to the knowledge of the passenger,
which are reasonable in their character and not inconsistent with any
statute or their duties to the public, to protect themselves against
liability, as insurers, for baggage exceeding a fixed amount in value,
except upon additional compensation, proportioned to the risk.
Id. at 27. See also Weld v. Postal Tel. Co., 92 N.E. 415, 419 (N.Y. 1910) ("[A]
regulation limiting the liability of a telegraph company for a mistake in an
'unrepeated' message to the price paid for sending it is reasonable.. . ."); Brief
of the Defendant in Error at 7, Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1894)
(No. 59) ("[Tlhe reward ought to be proportioned to the risk." (quoting Lord
Mansfield)) (citation omitted).
38. See Primrose, 154 U.S. at 27-28; see also Brief of Defendant in Error at
13-14, Primrose (No. 59) ("[Tlhere can be no justice in a rule which would hold a
telegraph company liable in many thousand dollars damages for an error in the
transmission of a message ... by the accidental change of a single dot. ").
39. See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Dougherty, 15 S.W. 468 (Ark. 1891); Hill v.
W. Union Tel. Co., 11 S.E. 874 (Ga. 1890); Albers v. W. Union Tel. Co., 66 N.W.
[Vol. 521386
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Union Telegraph Co. recognized a trend to permit telegraph
companies to ask customers to limit the companies' liabil-
ity,4 and was persuaded to accept the telegraph company's
limitation of liability clause on the grounds of proportional-
ity.41 Specifically, the company argued that it would be
unjust to hold it liable for the potentially large actual dam-
ages in return for the small compensation rendered for
service. 2 Simultaneously, the Kiley court rejected the ar-
gument that, because the modern business world depended
on telegraph transmission, public policy demanded that the
customer be protected against the negligence of the serving
company.43 The Kiley court announced what would become
the standard rule for limitation of utility liability: "It was
not shown that the failure was due to the willful miscon-
duct of the defendant, or to its gross negligence. 44 For ordi-
nary transmissions, the telegraph company was insulated
from liability for negligent errors in transmission, but not
grossly negligent errors.
The rule was also seen in Breese, where the New York
Court of Appeals held that a limitation of liability for mis-
take that did not rise to the level of "gross negligence or
willful misconduct" was valid so long as the customer was
provided notice of such limitation. 5 In successfully arguing
its position, U.S. Telegraph asserted that the external
1040 (Iowa 1896); Russell v. W. Union Tel. Co., 45 P. 598 (Kan. 1896); Cole v.
W. Union Tel. Co., 22 N.W. 385 (Minn. 1885); Young v. W. Union Tel. Co., 65
N.Y. 163 (1875); Wolf v. W. Union Tel. Co., 62 Pa. 83 (1869); Heimann v. W.
Union Tel. Co., 16 N.W. 32 (Wis. 1883).
40. 16 N.E. 75, 76 (N.Y. 1888) ("That a telegraph company has the right to
exact such a stipulation from its customers is the settled law in this and most of
the other states of the Union and in England.") (citing McAndrew v. Electric
Tel. Co., 33 Eng. L. and Eq. 180; W. Union Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525
(1867); Ellis v. Am. Tel. Co., 13 Mass. (13 Allen) 226 (1866); Redpath v. W.
Union Tel. Co., 112 Mass. 71 (1873); Grinnell v. W. Union Tel. Co., 113 Mass.
299 (1873); Clement v. W. Union Tel. Co., 137 Mass. 463 (1884); Schwartz v.
Atl. & Pac. Tel. Co., 25 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 157, 18 Hun. 157 (1879); Baldwin v. U.S.
Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 744 (1871); Breese v. U.S. Tel. Co., 48 N.Y. 132 (1871);
Kirkland v. Dinsmore, 62 N.Y. 171 (1875); Young v. W. Union Tel. Co., 65 N.Y.
163 (1875)).
41. See Supplemental Notes for the Respondent on the Validity of the
Message Blank Stipulation at 3, Kiley v. W. Union Tel. Co., 16 N.E. 75 (N.Y.
1888).
42. Id. (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525 (1867)).
43. See Appellant's Points at 21, Kiley, 16 N.E. 75.
44. Kiley, 16 N.E. at 77.
45. Breese, 48 N.Y. at 141 (Earl, C.).
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atmospheric conditions that can affect accurate telegraph
transmission beyond the company's control justified a con-
tractual limitation of its liability, because of clear problems
with causation.46 That is, if the company was liable for neg-
ligence, it could be found negligent even though the atmos-
pheric conditions caused the inaccuracy. This connection
between liability and the duty of care follows the distribu-
tion of risk through proportionality.
Proportionality was based on a dual rate structure,
whereby a customer could pay an additional rate to shift
liability to the company." Thus, the analysis focused on
assumption of risk: a customer who purchased the lesser
rate was presumed to have accepted the additional risk of
negligent transmission. The Breese court rejected the ar-
gument that, in purchasing the service, one might presume
that competent agents and due diligence are standard."
The two-tier system asked the customer to assess the value
of his risk through the alternate rates offered for the serv-
ice.
B. Regulation
As technology improved, and utility service expanded,
the legal relationships between utilities and their custom-
ers were managed by the courts. Ultimately, the common
law contract proved to be an insufficient protection of the
public's interest, and the government restricted the auton-
omy of the utility companies by statute.
1. Regulation by Common Law Contract. Initially,
courts regulated, the utility-customer relationship on the
basis of the bargained-for contract terms. From the dual
rate structure of common carriers and telegraph companies,
in which a customer could pay an additional rate to remove
the limitation of liability, arose the notion that considera-
46. Points on Behalf of Respondent at 10, Breese v. U.S. Tel. Co., 48 N.Y.
132 (1871).
47. See Birney v. N.Y. & Wash. Printing Tel. Co., 18 Md. 341 (1862); Carew,
15 Mich. at 530.
48. See Points for Appellant at 22, Breese, 48 N.Y. 132.
[Vol. 521388
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tion for liability was inherent in the basic rate.49 As utility
companies continued to grow and service larger areas, the
federal government developed regulations to control the
distribution of their commodities to increasingly dependent
customers. °
In 1887, Congress enacted the Interstate Commerce Act
("ICA") as "An Act to Regulate Commerce."51 The purpose of
the Interstate Commerce Act was to address the inconsis-
tencies and abuses that existed in the growing market for
interstate transportation.52 In 1910, Congress amended the
ICA to include telegraph transmissions."3 The ICA estab-
lished the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") with
the authority to enforce and adjust rates.54 In Boston &
Maine R.R. v. Hooker,"5 the Supreme Court was confronted
with the question of whether the limited liability provisions
were still valid after the passage of the ICA. The Court held
that the ICA, as amended in 1910, did not preclude a limi-
tation of liability: "The liability of a carrier under the Inter-
state Commerce Act was . . . 'not beyond the liability
imposed by the common law as... interpreted by this
court . .. . .
49. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 571 (1921) ("The
limitation of liability was an inherent part of the rate."); see also Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cramer, 232 U. S. 490, 493 (1914) ("[Mf a regularly filed
tariff offers two rates, based on value, and the goods are forwarded at the low
value in order to secure the low rate, then the carrier may avail itself of that
valuation when sued for loss or damage to the property."); Kan. City S. Ry. Co.
v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 652 (1913) ("The valuation the shipper declares
determines the legal rate where there are two rates based upon valuation.").
50. Throughout the development of the new markets, the challenge was in
promoting their development and increasing investment in new resources. See
HENRY S. DRINKER, JR., 1 A TREATISE ON THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT AND
DIGEST OF DECISIONS CONSTRUING THE SAME 54 (1909). Additionally, there were
inadequacies with the common law control of utility operations, including no
required publication of rates, no criminal provisions against the carriers and no
standard charge other than a vague "reasonable" rate. Id. at 60-61.
51. Pub. L. No. 49-104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
52. See DRINKER, supra note 50, at 55-65.
53. Pub. L. No. 61-309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (1910); see Esteve Bros., 256
U.S. at 570 ("The Act of June 18, 1910, broadened the scope of the Act to
Regulate Commerce to include 'telegraph, telephone and cable companies .... '")
(citation omitted).
54. Pub. L. No. 49-104, §§ 11, 12, 15, 24 Stat. at 383-84 (1887).
55. 233 U.S. 97 (1914).
56. Id. at 120. The Court continued to point out that the common law
standard was that a "carrier may by a fair, open, just and reasonable agreement
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Concurrently, regulation of the electricity market took
shape. The electricity market developed more slowly than
the markets of the common carriers and of the telegraph;
later, the regulations of electricity reflected similar earlier
regulations affecting these other industries. Moreover, since
the turn of the twentieth century, electricity markets were
limited to small geographic areas within states,57 and the
federal government did not have much of a role in their
regulation.
At the state level, it was assumed that private competi-
tion was the best means of regulation of electric fran-
chises.5" In fact, as small franchises developed into privately
owned local electric companies, state legislatures acted to
protect competition within local markets.59 Eventually,
larger companies created monopolies in each service region
by overwhelming the small local electric companies."
The well-known economist of regulation, Alfred E.
Kahn, suggests three primary economic factors in the
development of utility regulation: (1) the impact of the
industries on the size and growth of the economy; (2) the
lower costs of "natural monopoly"; and (3) the disappoint-
ment with competition.6 Additionally, Professor Kahn
argues that the public tended to be more concerned about
reliability, continuity, and safety of service than with the
limit the amount recoverable by a shipper in case of loss or damage to an agreed
value made for the purpose of obtaining the lower of two or more rates of
charges proportioned to the amount of the risk." Id. See also DRINKER, supra
note 50, at 381 ("If a rate is conditioned upon the shipper's assuming the risk of
loss due to causes beyond the carrier's control, the condition is valid.") (citing 13
I.C.C. Rep. 550).
57. See RICHARD HELLMAN, GOVERNMENT COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY 8-10 (1972).
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id. at 9 ("State legislatures for a time were insistent that consolidation
should not be allowed to eliminate competition in the public utility industry. All
states but six at some time enacted legislation to preserve competition.").
60. For example, by 1907, the Consolidated Gas Company controlled
companies that supplied over 98 percent of Greater New York City's electric
service. Id.
61. ALFRED E. KAHN, 1 THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 11 (1970). However, notwithstanding the economic rationale
identified by Professor Kahn here, he questions both the validity and economic
legitimacy of each of these reasons for regulation throughout his analysis of
regulatory economics.
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price, or rate, of the service.62 Rigid regulation was an at-
tractive alternative to an unsuccessful competitive struc-
ture.63 The failure of private competition as a form of self-
regulation led to public regulation of electric utilities. 4
2. State Regulation. In 1907, New York State enacted
the Public Service Law,65 which established the Public
Service Commission ("Commission" or "PSC") to regulate
utility companies in the state.66 Electric utilities were
required to file tariff schedules with the Commission;6 7 after
the Commission approved the tariff, it took on the force of
law.6" Thus, electricity consumers were compelled to agree
to the terms of the tariffs negotiated by the electric compa-
nies and approved by the Commission, as a condition of
receiving electricity service. All customers in a locality
could purchase service from only one utility company.
62. Id. at 21. This is critical to the analysis of the validity of limitation of
liability. In the utility system, the consumer accepted the limitation of liability
in return for quality of service. However, if the competitive environment
provides diminished service, imposition of liability could be used as a negative
incentive to engender quality service.
63. See DOUGLAS D. ANDERSON, REGULATORY POLITICS AND ELECTRIC
UTILITIES: A CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 35 (1981) ("Competition... had
not lowered the price of electricity but had only made investments riskier and
costs higher.").
64. See HELLMAN, supra note 57, at 10. Nevertheless, the industry did not
necessarily welcome regulation. In his address to the National Electric Light
Association ("NELA"), the president of NELA warned: "The one great and
constant menace to the industry is unwise, burdensome and restrictive
legislation by the municipality and the state.... " Id. at 15. But see ANDERSON,
supra note 63, at 33 ("If other utilities saw state regulation as inimical to their
interests, electric utilities in the leading states did not. That the utilities sought
to preserve their autonomy is uncontested; they did this not by opposing state
regulation but by seeking it.").
65. 1907 N.Y. Laws 429.
66. Id. § 65.
67. Id. § 66.
68. Lee v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 413 N.Y.S.2d 826, 828 (N.Y. App.
Term. 1978).
Once accepted by the Commission, the tariff schedule (including the
limitation of liability provision) takes on the force and effect of law and
governs every aspect of the utility's rates and practices; neither party
can depart from the measure of compensation or standard of liability
contained therein (Public Service Law, § 66, subd. 12).
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In return for state-sanctioned monopoly over a desig-
nated franchise territory, the Commission was given the
power to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.69 The Com-
mission's rulings were subject to judicial review. ° As the
regulation of electric utilities evolved, the reasonable rate
became a question of rate of return.71 Utilities were permit-
ted to charge a fixed rate above the cost of service, thereby
ensuring a consistent rate of return on their capital invest-
ment. 2 Thus, the electric utilities were restricted by a rate
of return, but experienced consistent profits by virtue of the
state-sanctioned monopoly. As the market grew with
consumption, each utility benefited free from the costs of a
competitive market. The electric utilities were required to
serve their franchise area without discrimination;7 this re-
69. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66 (McKinney 2000). For a discussion of how
the courts established reasonable rates, see generally Robert H. Whitten, Fair
Value for Rate Purposes, 27 HARv. L. REV. 419 (1914).
70. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S.
418, 458 (1890) ("The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for
transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the element of
reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the public, is
eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for
its determination.").
[T]he basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be
charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative
sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it for the
convenience of the public. And in order to ascertain that value, the
original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent
improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock,
the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates
prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating
expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such
weight as may be just and right in each case.
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898). See also 1 KAHN, supra note 61, at
35-41.
71. 1 KAHN, supra note 61, at 41 ("[T]he substantive question [remains] of
how much return on investment should be incorporated in the total cost of
service .. ").
72. See George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories
of Regulation" Debate, 36 J.L. & ECON. 289, 298 (1993).
73. See, e.g., Levine v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 131 N.Y.S. 255, 257 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1911) (The utility company "had a statutory duty to supply from
which it could not escape, except under defined circumstances."); accord
Esposito v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 68 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct.
1947) (citing Levine and Transportation Corporations Law § 12). See also
Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Littleton, 77 So. 565, 570 (Ala. 1917)
(order on rehearing) ("This duty, placed upon every one exercising a public
calling, is primarily a duty to serve every man who is a member of the public
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striction became one of the primary justifications for
indemnity by tariff.7 4 As a result, the paradox of regulation
emerged: providing the incentives of a competitive market
in a regulated state.75
3. The Introduction of Standard Limitation of Liability
Provisions. In 1938, the New York PSC reviewed the
legitimacy of limitation of liability provisions in electric
utility tariffs.76 In its decision, the Commission examined
three limitations of liability with regard to electric utilities:
(1) for the negligent interruption of service;77 (2) for negli-
gence relating to the utility's property;" and (3) for negli-
gence with respect to the supply or use of electricity. 9
First, concerning the focus of this comment-negligent
interruption of service-the Commission found that, consis-
tent with common law precedent at the time, 0 an electric
utility should be permitted to include a limitation of liabil-
ity clause in its tariff, the purpose of which would be to
protect the utility against claims of interruption of service
due to the negligence of the utility or its agents.8' The
needing that service.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Hansen
v. Vallejo Elec. Light & Power Co., 188 P. 999, 1000 (Cal. 1920) ("[A] gas or
electric light company must supply gas or electricity to any building or premises
distant not more than 100 feet from any main or direct or primary wire of the
corporation, 'upon the application in writing of the owner or occupant .... '. );
Snell v. Clinton Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co., 63 N.E. 1082, 1084 (Ill. 1902)
(holding that, because of the company's monopoly, it had a duty to serve the
city's inhabitants "without discrimination").
74. See Application of Cent. Power and Light Co. for Approval of Tariff
Amendment & Application of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. for Approval of Tariff
Amendment, 7 Tex. P.U.C. Bull. 53, 1981 WL 178870 (1981).
75. See 1 KAHN, supra note 61, at 44.
76. Re Liab. Clauses in Rate Schedules of Gas and Elec. Corps., 26 P.U.R.
(N.S.) 373 (1938).
77. Id. at 374-75.
78. Id. at 375.
79. Id.
80. See Silver's Lunch Stores v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 255 N.Y.S.
515 (City Ct. 1932); Weld v. Postal Tel. Co., 92 N.E. 415 (N.Y. 1910); see
generally Memorandum in Behalf of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., In
the Matter of The Investigation on Motion of the Commission as to inclusion by
Gas and Elec. Corps. of Liability Clauses in their Rate Schedules and
Application Forms, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) 373 (May 11, 1938) (Case No. 9439).
81. Re Liab. Clauses, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) at 374-75. Specifically, the
Commission provided the exact language that would achieve such a result:
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Commission based its order on a number of factors, each of
which was related to the regulation of the electric industry.
For instance, the utilities had argued that the regula-
tions operated to restrict their operations.82 In particular,
the obligation of each electric utility to serve its service area
without having the ability to choose its customers contrib-
uted to the discussion of the legitimacy of the limitation
provision.83 The electric utilities further claimed that, in
order to assume liability for absolutely continuous service,
they would have to demand excessive compensation for or-
dinary service." It was noted that the primary justification
for sanctioning the limitation of liability provision was to
protect the public from increased rates. 5 Additionally, the
utilities asserted that the liability exposure was potentially
incalculable and unbounded.86
The Commission's order affirmed the common law rule 7
that a utility may not limit its liability for damages that
result from its gross negligence or willful misconduct." The
Commission's order authorizing the limitation of liability
provision for the negligent interruption of service was a
The Commission will not object to the inclusion in said schedules of the
following clause: 'The company will endeavor at all times to provide a
regular and uninterrupted supply of service, but in case the supply of
service shall be interrupted or irregular or defective or fail from causes
beyond its control or through ordinary negligence of employees,
servants, or agents the company will not be liable therefor.'
Id. (emphasis added).
82. See Brief for the Niagara Hudson System at 3, In the Matter of The
Investigation on Motion of the Commission as to inclusion by Gas and Elec.
Corps. of Liability Clauses in their Rate Schedules and Application Forms, 26
P.U.R. (N.S.) 373 (Apr. 28, 1938) (Case No. 9439).
83. Id. at 6.
84. Id. at 21-22; see also supra note 49.
85. Memorandum in Behalf of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. at 21,
Re Liability Clauses, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) 373 (May 11, 1938) (Case No. 9439).
86. Brief for the Niagara Hudson System at 12-14, Re Liability Clauses, 26
P.U.R. (N.S.) 373 (May 11, 1938) (Case No. 9439). In fact, the utilities argued
that the absence of the limitation of liability clauses would encourage frivolous
litigation. Id. at 16.
87. See Breese, 48 N.Y. 132, 141-42 (1871). Accord Weld v. Postal Tel. Co., 92
N.E. 415, 418 (N.Y. 1910); cf Kiley v. W. Union Tel. Co., 16 N.E. 75, 76 (N.Y.
1888).
88. Re Liab. Clauses, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) at 374. See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 16, § 218.1(a) (2004) (prohibiting limitation of liability provisions
for "gross negligence or willful misconduct").
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quid pro quo for the imposition of regulatory restrictions on
the utilities. That is, in return for serving the public inter-
est, through a fixed rate of return and reliability
standards,8 the Commission found the limitation clause to
be appropriate. In fact, the limitation provision was, con-
cededly, in the best interest of the public-it functioned to
keep the cost of service low.9"
Second, the Commission denied the utilities' request to
limit their liability for damages that result from their neg-
ligence regarding their property.9 In support of its applica-
tion, the utilities argued that, in the unique nature of the
electric industry, the utilities do not always have control of
the atmospheric conditions that can affect their property,
including transmission lines.92 However, the Commission
weighed the public interest as greater than that of the utili-
ties. ' Moreover, there was no consideration offered by the
utilities in return for the desired liability protection, in
contrast to the regulatory restrictions quid pro quo for the
limitation provision for interruption of service.
Third, the Commission refused to extend liability pro-
tection to the utilities for damages consequent to a utility's
negligence in the supply or use of electricity.94 The Commis-
89. Reliability standards were met by pooling certain generators with
bilateral contracts to maintain system reliability. See In re Competitive
Opportunities Regarding Elec. Serv., No. 94-E-0952, 1996 N.Y. P.U.C. LEXIS
329, *56 (May 3, 1996).
90. See Memorandum of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. at 23, Re
Liability Clauses, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) 373 (May 11, 1938) (Case No. 9439) ("The
piresent Rate Schedule covers only the supplying of current under existing
imitations of liability.").
91. Re Liab. Clauses, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) at 375 ("The companies should be
required to cancel any clause in their schedules which seeks to limit the liability
of the company for damages resulting from its own negligence in connection
with the property owned, installed, or maintained by the customer or leased by
the customer from third parties."). See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
16, § 218.1(b) (2004) (barring similar provisions). The standard is relevant in
analyzing the events surrounding the August 14, 2003 blackout. See discussion
infra Part II(B).
92. Memorandum of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. at 28-30, Re
Liability Clauses, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) 373 (May 11, 1938) (Case No. 9439).
93. See Re Liab. Clauses, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) at 375.
94. Id. ("The companies should be required to cancel any clause in their
schedules which seeks to limit the liability of the company for any damages
resulting from the negligence of the company in connection with the supply or
use of electricity.. . ."). See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 218.1(c)
(2004) (removing similar provisions). See Flex-O-Vit USA, Inc. v. Niagara
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sion declined to permit limitation of liability for damages
resulting from a utility's negligence vis-A-vis the utility's
equipment on the customer's property.95 The Commission's
order abandoned the traditional rationale exercised by the
courts that utility companies should not be liable for dam-
ages that are beyond their immediate control. 96 The
Commission was not persuaded by the arguments pre-
sented by the utilities in support of a limitation of liability
provision for such damages.
The Legislature has since codified each of the elements
of the Commission's ruling.98
4. 1977 New York City Blackout. Litigation over the
assessment of damages resulting from the interruption of
electricity service caused by the 1977 New York City black-
out demonstrated the effect of the limitation of liability
provisions in electric utility tariffs; most notably, the New
York Court of Appeals decision in Food Pageant, Inc. v.
Consolidated Edison Co.99
After the 1977 blackout, there was evidence that Con-
solidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. ("Con Ed"), the
electric utility that served New York City, had been negli-
gent in its response to lightning striking its lines, and that
negligence caused the blackout."' The New York Court of
Appeals sustained the lower court's holding that Con Ed, in
accordance with its tariff, could not "be held liable for inter-
Mohawk Power Corp., 739 N.Y.S.2d 785, 788 (App. Div. 2002), for an
application of this provision.
95. Re Liab. Clauses, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) at 375 (stating that a limitation
should not be permitted for "the presence or operation of the company's
structures, equipment, wires, pipes, appliances, or devices on the customer's
premises").
96. This principle was one of the primary justifications for limiting the
liability of common carriers and telegraph companies. See supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
97. See Memorandum of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. at 28-30, Re
Liability Clauses, 26 P.U.R. (N.S.) 373 (May 11, 1938) (Case No. 9439).
98. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 218.1 (2004).
99. 429 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 1981). See Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d
34 (N.Y. 1985); Lee v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 413 N.Y.S.2d 826 (App. Div.
1978).
100. Food Pageant, 429 N.E.2d at 739; see also FERC, FINAL STAFF REPORT,
CON EDISON POWER FAILURE OF JULY 13 AND 14, 1977 (Dep't of Energy, FERC
June 1978).
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ruption of service due to the ordinary negligence of its
agents and employees."10 1 The court, as the Public Service
Commission had in 1938, relied on its holding in Weld for
the stipulation that a utility may limit its liability to gross
negligence.1"2 Ultimately, however, the court upheld the
jury's conclusion that Con Ed's conduct constituted gross
negligence.103
In determining the extent of Con Ed's liability for gross
negligence, the New York Court of Appeals limited the
cause of action to Con Ed's direct customers in Strauss v.
Belle Realty Co."' Writing for the majority, Judge Kaye
(now Chief Judge) asserted that "an orbit of duty based on
public policy may at times result in the exclusion of some
who might otherwise have recovered for losses or injuries if
traditional tort principles had been applied. 1" Judge Kaye
recognized that Con Ed's potential liability was "enor-
mous," 10 6 and that there was little inequity to demand an
extension of liability.107 According to Judge Meyer's dissent,
the court concluded that Con Ed's potential liability was a
much greater concern than the protection of injured third
parties.0 "
In the wake of the 1977 blackout, there was little
debate in New York over the validity of the limitation of li-
ability provision. 10 9 However, the Texas Public Utility
Commission ("PUC") addressed the issue succinctly in
101. Food Pageant, 429 N.E.2d at 740.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 740-41.
104. 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985); accord Milliken & Co. v. Consol. Edison Co.
of N.Y., 644 N.E.2d 268 (N.Y. 1994) (holding, in a claim unrelated to the 1977
blackout, that the electric utility did not have a duty to third party commercial
tenants of a building serviced by the utility).
105. Strauss, 482 N.E.2d at 36.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 38.
108. See id. at 40-41 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Judge Meyer disagreed with the
premise of the majority opinion that the interest of protecting the electricity
industry was so great. Id.
109. In fact, in Lee v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 413 N.Y.S.2d 826 (App.
Div. 1978), Appellate Term rejected the holding of the lower court that the
limitation of liability provision in Con Ed's tariff was invalid because it violated




1981.'"' The PUC gave four justifications for the limitation
of liability: rates, the nature and size of potential claims,
the difficulty in estimating the risk, and the claim that cus-
tomers are in a better position to protect themselves."' As
would the Strauss court four years later, the PUC recog-
nized the excessive liability to which the utility could be
exposed, and based its decision, in part, on the restrictive
nature of the regulations. 1 2 The PUC suggested that the
utility's rate of return is based on the assumption that it is
not subject to liability."3 The utilities persuaded the PUC,
relying on the holding of the Supreme Court in Esteve Bros.,
that the limitation of liability was inherent in the rate
structure."' The PUC went further to assert that an
unregulated utility might experience greater liability."5
The Texas Supreme Court recently confronted the ques-
tion of whether the limitation of liability provisions were
valid in Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Auchan."6 Al-
though the Auchan court upheld the PUC's reasoning, it
took note of the ongoing restructuring of the electricity
market and suggested that a review of electric utility
liability may be appropriate."7 Subsequently, the PUC sus-
tained its approach and upheld the viability of the liability
limitation."
110. See Application of Cent. Power and Light Co. for Approval of Tariff
Amendment Application of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. for Approval of Tariff
Amendment, Docket Nos. 3198 and 3234, 7 Tex. P.U.C. Bull. 53, 1981 WL
178870 (1981).
111. Application of Cent. Power & Light Co., 1981 WL 178870, at *1.
112. Id. at *5.
113. Id. The PUC rationale is consistent with the holding of the Supreme
Court in W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566 (1921).
114. Brief of Intervenor Houston Lighting & Power Co. at 12, Applicaton of
Cent. Power & Light Co., 1981 WL 178870 (1981). Intervenor Houston Lighting
& Power, for example, argued that since the overall cost of providing service
was the baseline for determining the regulated rate, the limitation of liability
directly affected the rate. Id. at 16.
115. Application of Cent. Power & Light Co., 1981 WL 178870, at *5.
116. 995 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1999).
117. Id. at 675.
118. 26 Tex. Reg. 1310, 1315-19 (2001). Electric utilities in Texas are not
subject to jurisdiction of the FERC. See FTC STAFF REPORT, COMPETITION AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES ON ELEC. POWER REGULATORY REFORM
app. at A119-27 (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter FTC: COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION]. The issue of jurisdictional sovereignty is pertinent for two
reasons: (1) the PUC operates under guidelines that are analogous to the
1398 [Vol. 52
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C. Federal Regulation of the National Grid
The interconnection of local intrastate utility companies
between states required federal regulation. The wholesale
exchange of electricity among utility companies developed
from the federal integration of the national grid.
1. The Federal Power Act of 1935. As the scope of the
market for electricity grew119 between and among states,
Congress enacted the Federal Power Act2 ° ("FPA") in 1935
to give the Federal Power Commission ("FPC"), the prede-
cessor to the FERC, the authority to regulate the interstate
transmission of electricity. 2 ' Specifically, the FPC governed
the rate schedules for interstate wholesale transactions
between utilities. As with the state commissions, one of the
primary missions of the FPC was to protect consumer inter-
ests. '2
The FPC advanced the demands of the electric industry
by standardizing interstate transmission. The structure of
the national grid, based on separate but interconnected,
self-sufficient, vertically integrated electric utilities,
resulted naturally from cost and technological constraints
FERC's Regional Transmission Organization ("RTO") model today, and (2) since
Texas is an independent system, its rules are relevant only to its intrastate
customers. For a detailed discussion of the PUC's decision and how it relates to
FERC's administration of limitation of liability provisions in RTOs, see Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Regional Transmission Organizations: Federal Limitations
Needed for Tort Liability, 23 ENERGY L.J. 63, 66-76 (2002). For a discussion on
the FERC's RTO model, see Order No. 2000, F.E.R.C. Stats & Regs. P 31,089
(1999).
119. Between 1902 and 1972, the electric industry grew by over 300 times,
in terms of electricity generation. STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY,
ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 90 (1974).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 792 (1935).
121. Id. § 797.
122. BREYER & MACAVOY, supra note 119, at 1. The FPC's goals were to
maintain a low cost of service and increase the extent of service. From an
economist's perspective, the FPC's objectives were to cause an equal
distribution of income and increase economic efficiency among power utilities.
Id. at 2-3.
123. Companies, such as electric utilities, which provide successive
functions of both production and distribution of a product, are "vertically
integrated." In contrast, horizontally integrated companies operate a number of
facilities providing the same service at each level. See 2 KAHN, supra note 61, at
251.
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on the capability to transmit electricity over vast dis-
tances.124
Included in the FPC's powers was the ability to fix and
review utility rate schedules.'25 In Nebbia v. New York,'26
the Supreme Court held that governmental price regulation
of a private industry did not violate the U.S. Constitution.
127
Although the Nebbia case reviewed regulation of consumer
milk prices, the Court suggested that utilities would have
less of a constitutional claim against price regulation, due
to its public nature. 2 ' Although the FPA did not specifically
address interruption of service (the FPA applied exclusively
to interstate transactions that were generally between util-
ity companies), the Act reflected the regulatory consensus
for encouraging the development of the electricity market
by limiting utility liability.
2. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Tradi-
tionally, public utility companies have used holding compa-
nies 129 to diversify their financial interests in order to
reduce their exposure to the market. 130 Additionally, holding
companies allowed utility companies to realize a greater
profit on their investment-the utility companies could re-
invest their income, from their guaranteed rate of return, in
companies with greater potential return. However, the risk
of these investments was much larger than the limited risk
124. See FERC Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R. Parts 35 and 385, LEXSEE 61 FR
21540 (FERC May 10, 1996).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 791a (1935); see, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of
Colored People v. FPC, 426 U.S. 662 (1976).
126. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
127. Id. at 537 (holding that "there can be no doubt that upon proper
occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate a business in any
of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the products or commodities
it sells"). In addressing the Nebbia case, Professor Kahn explains that, "the
Supreme Court finally rejected the notion that there was anything
constitutionally sacrosanct about private price-determination . . . ." 1 KAHN,
supra note 61, at 21.
128. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 531-33. The Court's reasoning is similar to the
"quasi-public" label that the Court employed in earlier decisions concerning
telegraph service and common carriers. -See supra note 16.
129. A "holding company" is a company that owns or controls 10 percent or
more of the voting securities of a public utility company. PUCHA, 15 U.S.C. §
79b(a)(7)(A) (1996).
130. DOUGLAS W. HAWES, UTILITY HOLDING COS. § 1.03, 1-5 (1987).
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In response to antitrust considerations and the lack of
regulatory control of utility holding companies, 32 Congress
enacted the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
("PUCHA").13 President Franklin D. Roosevelt perceived
public control of utility holding companies as essential to
protect the public's interest in regulated public utilities."4
The primary limitation PUHCA placed on public utility
holding companies was the extent to which they could di-
versify their interests; public utility holding companies
were limited to investments that were functionally related
to and did not overwhelm their utility interests.
35
Subsequently, state regulators began to assert their
control over public utility holding companies. In 1972, the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
("NARUC") recommended that state commissioners control
the investment of utility funds.1 36 The New York PSC recog-
nized the risk associated with restructuring public utility
companies in the formation of a holding company: "[T]he
formation of a holding company would create an inequitable
distribution of risk.... The public interest in a holding
company arrangement seems illusory to us, therefore, while
the disadvantages are quite definite."3 7 The PSC identified
131. In fact, the risk of the public utility holding company was borne by the
utility's customers. If non-utility investments failed, the utility's cost of capital
would increase, and this increase would translate into an increase in customers'
rates. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RECD-92-98, ELECTRICITY SUPPLY:
REGULATING UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES IN A CHANGING ELECTRIC INDUSTRY
app. II at 17-18 (Apr. 9, 1992) [hereinafter GAO: REGULATING UTILITY HOLDING
Cos.]. In the deregulated structure, investors continue to search for stable
market structure before committing capital. See Paul L. Joskow, Electricity
Sector Restructuring and Competition: Lessons Learned, 40 LATIN AM. J. ECON.
548, 555 (2003).
132. HAWES, supra note 130, at § 2.05, 2-14 through 2-18.
133. PUCHA, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1996).
134. HAWES, supra note 130, at § 2.05, 2-15 through 2-17. The primary goals
of PUHCA included concerns regarding how states could control public utility
holding companies and their effect on the state's internal public utility system.
Concern of the states' exposure to risk centered on their dependence on
adequate service. See id.
135. Id. at §§ 3.06, 3-40 through 3-49.
136. Id. at § 4.02, 4-5.
137. Rochester Tel. Co., 18 N.Y. P.S.C. 271, 274 (1978). See also HAWES,
supra note 130, at § 4.03, 4-43 (discussing the PSC decision).
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the unique concern contained in the structure of utility
holding companies: diversification of public utility compa-
nies through financial holdings in other states introduces
economic risks that are outside the control of the state
regulatory commission. Since the state granted public utili-
ties monopolies and, in turn, became considerably depend-
ent on them, the state necessarily had an interest in
maintaining the financial soundness of the utilities. Thus,
it was imperative that the states retain control over the
utility's financial management. State control of holding
companies was consistent with the overwhelming concern
for safe and reliable of service.
Recently, although not a novel proposition,13 there has
been pressure to repeal PUHCA"9 Although the analysis of
whether repeal is advisable is beyond the scope of this
comment, the rationale behind the proposal is relevant to
the analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the
deregulated electricity sector. The basis for repeal of
PUHCA rests fundamentally on the concept of deregulation.
It is argued that PUHCA acts only as an inhibitor to the
electric companies' full realization of their profit potential.14 °
However, the reasoning that Congress and the New York
PSC applied to public utilities, namely, protecting the con-
sumer from undue risk, remains valid. If the electric utili-
ties are permitted to expose their customers to financial
risk, the justification for sanctioning limitation of liability
provisions is diminished.
3. The Price-Anderson Act and Nuclear Indemnity. The
nuclear power industry presents an anomalous situation for
an indemnity analysis, since it relates to general tort
actions rather than to contract. Congress adopted the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954'14 to stimulate investment and
development of nuclear power. At the time, nuclear power
was viewed as an alternative to traditional fossil-fuel and
hydroelectric generation. However, it was argued that,
138. See HAWES, supra note 130, at §1.04, 1-9.
139. See, e.g., R. Richard Geddes, Time to Repeal the Public Utility Holding
Company Act, 16 CATO J. 63 (1996), available at http://www.cato.orgpubs/
journal/cjl6nl-4.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
140. See id. at 63-64.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1954).
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given the potential risk, private capital would not be in-
vested in nuclear projects without indemnification for cata-
strophic accidents'42 The Price-Anderson Act"' amended the
Atomic Energy Act to provide compensation to the public in
the event of a nuclear accident and to remove the liability
impediment to private investment in nuclear power. 44 The
Price-Anderson amendments provided that the government
would indemnify a nuclear accident for up to $560 million
in damages, and no indemnified party-the company, its
contractors, its operators-would be exposed to liability for
negligence, apart from the $560 million fund. 1 5 Over time,
the nuclear plant owners have paid into the indemnity fund
for its participants, removing the governmental funding
altogether.'
It has been suggested that nuclear indemnity in
deregulation could lead to a greater propensity for a nuclear
accident, as electric companies become more focused on
profitability. 7 The debate over whether Price-Anderson in-
demnity should continue to insulate the owners of nuclear
power plants has re-emerged recently.
4 8
142. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NUCLEAR REGULATION: A
PERSPECTIVE ON LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR A NUCLEAR PLANT ACCIDENT 10
(1987) [hereinafter GAO: NUCLEAR REGULATION: A PERSPECTIVE ON LIABILITY].
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1957).
144. GAO: NUCLEAR REGULATION: A PERSPECTIVE ON LIABILITY, supra note
142, at 10.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2210.
146. See GAO: NUCLEAR REGULATION: A PERSPECTIVE ON LIABILITY, supra
note 142, at 11.
147. Comprehensive National Energy Policy: Prepared Witness Testimony
Before The Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy and
Air Quality, 108th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Aurilio Testimony]
(testimony of Anna Aurilio, Legislative Director, U.S. Pub. Interest Research
Group), at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108Hearings/03052003heraring
801/Auriliol3l7print.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
148. There is a current international trend to increase investment in
nuclear power as an alternative to fossil-fuel and hydroelectric generation. See
Jad Mouawad, Slow Learner on Energy-Efficient Front: While U.S. Backslides,
France Offers Lessons in Cutting Oil Use, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2004, at Cl;
Bernard Simon, Ontario Considers Building a Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 2004, at W1 (In the wake of the August 2003 blackout, "moves are under
way... to build the first nuclear reactor in North America in more than two
decades."). In fact, it is likely that nuclear power will expand in the United
States as well. See Matthew L. Wald, Energy Providers Seek Grant As Step to
Build Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at C4 ("[A] consortium of
companies plans to ask the federal government on Monday for $400 million to
help prepare an application to build a [nuclear) reactor."). Thus, the original
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D. Deregulation
Throughout most of the twentieth century, electricity
service was managed through strict regulatory schemes.
Toward the end of the century, however, regulations were
relaxed in order to provide more efficient service.
1. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. The
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.. ("PURPA")
marked the introduction of competition into the regulatory
scheme of the electricity market. PURPA was enacted in
response to the energy crisis during the 1970s, and a recog-
nition of the nation's over dependence on fossil fuels as a
source of energy.15 ° PURPA permitted "qualifying facili-
ties" '5 to sell independently generated power to electric
utilities. Although the rate at which utilities were required
to purchase power from qualifying facilities corresponded to
the utilities' avoided costs, 5 ' the increase in the use of inde-
pendently generated power, and away from vertically
rationale for Price-Anderson has resurfaced: "Nobody's going to invest in
nuclear power plants [without renewal of Price-Anderson]." Cheney Says Push
Needed to Boost Nuclear Power, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, May 15, 2001, at
http://web.archive.org/web/20010522054102/http://dailynews.yahoo.com/nm/2
0010515/ts/bushenergy-cheney-dc_4.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
149. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
150. See S. REP. No. 95-442, 7 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-361, 32 (1977). The
vertically integrated utility structure had become inefficient, and rates began to
increase. PURPA expressly promoted efficiency in electricity generation;
distribution and transmission remained the role of the public utilities. GAO:
REGULATING UTILITY HOLDING COS., supra note 131, at app. II at 19. See also
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745-46 (1982).
151. Qualifying facilities are generators that use renewable resources for
energy (e.g. solar or wind) or certain cogenerators. GAO: REGULATING UTILITY
HOLDING COS., supra note 131, at 19, n.4. Since many utility companies could
not meet the requirements as qualifying facilities, they established independent
power producers ("IPP"s) to take advantage of the new market in terms of
generation. Thus, utility companies could expand their profitability within the
constructs of the regulated market. The IPPs sold power exclusively to utilities,
and were designed for that limited purpose.
The significant effect of PURPA was that non-utility companies entered the
market by forming IPPs. These non-utility IPPs then competed with utility-
owned IPPs and utility generators. Consequently, electricity generation moved
away from the vertically integrated utility structure to a competitive wholesale
market.
152. See Michael J. Schewel, Jurassic Sparks! Project Finance Revives
Extinct Deals, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 26, 28.
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integrated utility generation, spurred the movement toward
a deregulated, competitive market.
PURPA removed some of the regulatory controls that
governed electric utilities. For instance, qualifying facilities
were not subject to the same reliability standards as the
facilities of regulated utilities.'53 Thus, the justifications for
the established rules that administered public utilities
began to erode as state control lessened. As technological
improvements and derivative incentives from PURPA
shifted investment from large generating facilities serving
vertically integrated electric utilities to smaller generating
facilities, the development of a national, competitive, un-
regulated electricity market expanded.
5 4
2. Energy Policy Act of 1992. During the 1980s, the
regulation of the electric industry changed focus from
governmental oversight to dependence on market forces as
a means. It was believed that the use of markets would
lower costs and prices by presenting incentives for efficiency
and the development of new technology.'55 Congress enacted
the Energy Policy Act of 199256 to expand the maturing
competitive wholesale market. Essentially, the Act removed
the PUHCA limitations on the PURPA principles of inde-
pendent power production.'57
However, the goals of the Energy Policy Act would not
be implemented until the FERC issued Orders 88818 and
889,1 thereby opening the national grid to wholesale buy-
ers and sellers of electricity. Order 888 mandated that
transmission line owners-the vertically integrated electric
utilities-permit others to use their transmission services
under similar terms and conditions. 6 ° In effect, private,
153. GAO: REGULATING UTILITY HOLDING COS., supra note 131, at 20.
154. See Schewel, supra note 152.
155. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-271, LESSONS LEARNED FROM
ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: TRANSITION TO COMPETITIVE MARKETS UNDERWAY,
BUT FULL BENEFITS WILL TAKE TIME AND EFFORT TO ACHIEVE 18-19 (December
17, 2002) [hereinafter GAO: LESSONS LEARNED].
156. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
157. GAO: LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 155, at 27, n.2.
158. FERC Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R. Parts 35 & 385 (1996).
159. FERC Order 889, 18 C.F.R. Part 37 (1996).
160. GAO: LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 155, at 27.
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independent generators were given the benefits and use of
utility capital without bearing a significant economic disad-
vantage. The independent generators were given access to
and use of the utilities' transmission capabilities, and the
utilities could not charge the generators a substantial pre-
mium to transmit electricity across their lines.1 6 ' Thus,
independent generators were given access to the electricity
market without having to incur extraordinary start-up
capital costs-they used the existing infrastructure of the
utilities. In fact, because the independent generators could
sell power at market-based rates, they had a distinct
advantage over utility generation: greater profit margin.
Order 889 sought to encourage competition by ensuring full
disclosure of information on transmission capacity and
prices through what was called the Open Access Same-Time
Information System ("OASIS")." 2 To implement OASIS,
regulated utilities were compelled to disclose information
concerning their transmission lines. Although wholesale
transactions were deregulated, the CFR provisions indem-
nifying electric companies remained intact.'63 The ability to
transmit electricity across utility lines removed one of the
largest inhibitors for entry into the electricity market.
Thus, the "paradox of competition" emerged: transition to
competition in a market that remained dependent on regu-
lated entities for transmission and distribution."
161. GAO: REGULATING UTILITY HOLDING COS., supra note 131, at 19.
162. See GAO: LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 155, at 28. Some commenters
have indicated that OASIS was presented "as an innocuous information
protocol," but has contributed to a flawed market model. HARVARD ELECTRICITY
POLICY GROUP, RESHAPING THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY: A PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE
6 (2001) [hereinafter RESHAPING THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY].
163. See Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements &
Procedures, 18 C.F.R. Part 35 (Dep't of Energy, FERC Aug. 26, 2002); see also
FERC Order No. 2003, Standardization of Generator Interconnection
Agreements & Procedures, 18 C.F.R. Part 35 (2003).
164. FTC STAFF REPORT, COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
PERSPECTIVES ON ELEC. POWER REGULATORY REFORM 1 (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter
FTC: COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION].
The complete transition to competitive electricity has not yet occurred for
another reason. There remain fundamental limitations on the capacity to
deliver competitive energy at a price that justifies departure from utility
service. The largest inhibitor of competitive electricity marketing is the issue of
stranded costs-utility assets and financial arrangements that are lost or
stranded during the transition to a competitive market. RESHAPING THE
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY, supra note 162, at 10. For a discussion on the barriers to
fully realizing the benefits of a deregulated electric market, see generally
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II. EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION
Deregulation of the wholesale electricity market by fed-
eral legislation165 provided the framework for open-access
competition at the state level. Without deregulation of the
wholesale electricity market, competition in the retail mar-
ket would have been infeasible, as access to diverse sources
of electricity generation would not have been possible. In
creating a competitive market, regulators were confronted
with the same pre-regulation issues of how to control the
electricity market. The purpose of a competitive market was
to have rates that reflected market conditions. Theoreti-
cally, the rates would fall, as market forces caused electric
companies to purchase the cheapest available electricity,
thereby removing inefficiencies and reducing the electric
companies' cost of service. In turn, the savings between the
cost of service of a competitive provider and that of a utility
would be passed on to the consumer. However, as the
restrictions of regulation were lifted, so too was the control
over determining a "fair and reasonable rate." A market-
based rate is presumptively fair and reasonable, but, as
seen with the exercise of market power, the market may be
susceptible to manipulation.166 Regardless of the potential
ELECTRICITY ADVISORY BOARD ELECTRIC RESOURCES CAPITALIZATION CONCERNS
SUBCOMMITTEE, COMPETITIVE WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY GENERATION: A REPORT
OF THE BENEFITS, REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY, AND REMEDIES TO ENCOURAGE
FULL REALIZATION ACROSS ALL MARKETS (Sept. 2002); Stephen P. Sherwin,
Deregulation of Electricity In New York: A Continuing Odyssey, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 263, 283-301 (2001).
165. See discussion supra, Part I(D).
166. Basically, market power results when an energy supplier can withhold
its supply and increases its prices. See Sherwin, supra note 164, at 288. The
market is exceedingly susceptible to the exercise of market power during supply
shortages. This is precisely one of the factors that contributed to the California
electricity crisis in the summer of 2000. See James I. Serota, Monopoly Pricing
in a Time of Shortage, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 791 (2002).
A number of market mediation procedures have been developed to
counteract the potential for the exercise of market power, including, inter alia,
market monitoring and real-time curtailments. Essentially, in order to relieve
market power constraints, the market has to revert to many of the institutional
controls that resemble regulated utility service. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, Rep.
No. DOEIPO-0060, HORIZONTAL MARKET POWER IN RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY
MARKETS 14 (Mar. 2000). For an economic analysis of the effect of market
power, see Richard Gilbert, Karsten Neuhoff & David Newbery, Mediating
Market Power in Elec. Networks (Inst. of Bus. & Econ. Research, Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley, Paper No. E02-322, 2002), at http://repositories.cdlib.orgiber/cpc/
CPC02-032 (last visited Dec. 10, 2004). For the purposes of this comment,
market power is only relevant in so far as it exposes the additional risks
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risks to consumers, and assuming a pure, functional, mar-
ket-based rate, market participants are able to experience a
greater profit for the same service that was provided under
the regulated system: they can purchase power at a lower
price than the utility can produce it. That is, electricity
companies can import cheaper energy to a service area, if
such energy is available. Since the price of electricity fluc-
tuates, the electricity provider's margin of profit shifts with
the wholesale price. The difference between the cost of
service of a deregulated entity and that of a regulated
entity is reflected in the cost of service to the customer. As a
result, many states with high electricity costs supported the
transition to a competitive structure. 167
Prior to the transition to a competitive market, PURPA
and the Price-Anderson Act encouraged the development of
inefficient generation.1 6' Electric generation was in response
to legislative incentives and the demands of a vertically
integrated utility system, rather than to market demands.
Another concern for the competitive structure is the
reliability of service. Historically, reliability was understood
to be critical, irrespective of potentially higher rates.169 This
requirement follows logically from the permissive estab-
lishment of natural monopolies. In contrast, independent
power producers are not subject to the same rigid criteria.
In fact, if a competitive unregulated electric company can-
not serve its customers, the governing utility company typi-
cally supplies the power, as a "provider of last resort."7 '
Consequently, the competitive market, at least in the short
run, presents uncertainties that were settled in the regu-
lated structure.
171
assumed by the customer in a deregulated system. Because the allocation of
risks has changed, the rationale for imposing those risks on either the customer
or the electric company should be reconsidered.
167. See FTC: COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 118, at
3-4 & tbls.1-2.
168. Nuclear generation has proven to be particularly inefficient. See Aurilio
Testimony, supra note 147, at 5.
169. See 1 KAHN, supra note 61, at 21. In fact, the prevailing view was that
regulation was the best method of achieving reliability. See FTC: COMPETITION
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 118, at 1.
170. See Sherwin, supra note 164, at 276.
171. See MAGALI DELMAS & YESIM TOKAT, DEREGULATION PROCESS,
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND EFFICIENCY: THE U.S. ELECTRIC UTILITY SECTOR 6
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In order to oversee the transition through restructur-
ing, the FERC established independent system operators
("ISO"s). 17 2 An ISO is typically a non-profit, state-sanctioned
entity which organizes the transmission of power through-
out its area.173 Recently, the FERC considered and approved
a limitation of liability rule to insulate ISOs from liability
for negligence.174 It was argued that access to capital
investment and lower rates depended on significant liability
protection. 75 Additionally, the New York Transmission
Owners suggested that the limitation of liability provisions
would encourage participation in the competitive market. 76
Thus, were an ISO to be negligent in its management of its
service area, it would not be liable.
A. The California Energy Crisis
The California energy crisis resulted, in large part,
from inaccurate assumptions concerning the industry's re-
sponse to a deregulated market."7 That is because the fun-
(Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst., Energy Policy and Econ. Working Paper No. 004,
Mar. 2003).
172. See Sherwin, supra note 164, at 274.
173. See, e.g., NYISO, NYISO Overview, at http://www.nyiso.com/overview.
html (last visited Dec. 10, 2004) ("[The NYISO's] mission is to ensure the
reliable, safe and efficient operation of the State's major transmission system
and to administer an open, competitive and nondiscriminatory wholesale
market for electricity in New York State.").
174. See FERC, Docket No. RM01-12-000, In the Matter of Electricity
Market Design and Structure (Dec. 11, 2002).
175. Id. at 4-7 (testimony of Bob Garvin, Comm'r, Wis. Comm'n Dec. 11,
2002); see also FERC, Docket No. RM-12-000, Remedying Undue Discrimination
through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Elcectric Market
Design 4 (Dec. 11, 2002) (presentation of John D. McMahon) [hereinafter
McMahon Presentation] (arguing that "federal [limitation of liability] will result
in lower costs to consumers").
176. FERC, Docket No. RM01-12-000, Comments of Indicated New York
Transmission Owners on the Commission's SMD White Paper (Sept. 15, 2003).
177. See GAO, GAO-01-857, ENERGY MARKETS: RESULTS OF STUDIES
ASSESSING HIGH ELECTRICITY PRICES IN CALIFORNIA 3-4 (June 29, 2001)
[hereinafter GAO: HIGH ELEC. PRICES IN CAL.]. Since the market responds to
inconsistent customer demand, unpredictability and volatility are necessary
components of a competitive market-based structure. See 2 KAHN, supra note
61, at 13. In fact, the common consumer is not likely to adjust his consumption
to the market, thereby aggravating the fluctuation and predictability of the
market. Additionally, the customers' lack of market awareness could allow
electricity sellers to charge higher prices than the competitive market reflects.
GAO: LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 155, at 34-35.
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damental organization and justification for the regulated
market do not apply to a deregulated environment.
178
Specifically, California's energy market depended on an in-
terconnection between itself and eleven surrounding states
for both imports and exports of electricity. Although Cali-
fornia did not present a unique situation, its implemented
competitive structure encouraged market manipulation.
Thus, prices rose in response to an artificial market.179
The California energy crisis demonstrates the control
and oversight that the government forfeits in a deregulated
system. Reliability and quality of service, the public's
primary concerns,18 may be abandoned as electric compa-
nies become more focused on maximizing profit than on
ensuring performance.18 In a market-based structure, the
electric company realizes profit from the difference between
the wholesale purchase price and the retail sale price. In
the regulated system, the utility profited only upon sale-
the utility's rate of return was guaranteed and fixed.
Because the margin between the utility and the competitive
retail sale prices is narrow, the unregulated electric
company maximizes its profits through its purchase price.
Therefore, the services that contribute to reliability and
quality that are ancillary to the wholesale purchase may be
discarded in order to achieve maximum return on the
company's purchase efforts.
In California, since private companies had control of the
supply of electricity, and outages were beneficial to the
price, electric companies could stage outages that regula-
tors could not distinguish as legitimate or strategic.18 The
lack of administrative control in California is relevant to
the analysis of whether, in a deregulated system, the state
should impose liability for a negligent interruption of serv-
ice. That is, if the public is open to a greater risk, then is
the limitation of liability justified, as the restraints of
178. DELMAS & TOKAT, supra note 171, at 6.
179. GAO: HIGH ELEC. PRICES IN CAL., supra note 177, at 4.
180. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
181. "In production, cost minimization requires not only the fulfillment of
the familiar set of marginal equalities, but also the choice of the lowest-cost
production method available." Steven N. S. Cheung, Transaction Costs, Risk
Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements, 12 J.L. & Econ. 23, 42
(1969).
182. GAO: HIGH PRICES IN CAL., supra note 177, at 6.
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regulation are removed? Since the energy crisis, California
has suspended its transition to a competitive structure, to
review its market flaws."8 3 Liability for interruptions of
service also should be reviewed and adapted to the new
structure.
B. The August 14, 2003 Blackout
The blackout, which occurred on August 14, 2003,
throughout the Midwest and the Northeast, underscores
the question of limitation of liability. The blackout origi-
nated in Ohio, and spread throughout other markets
because of inadequate communication throughout the inter-
connection.' Additionally, the Midwest Independent
Service Operator ("MISO") was operating reliability and
contingency procedures in violation of the standards of the
North American Electric Reliability Council ("NERC").8 5 As
a result, the Ohio system did not have sufficient backup
generation to support the load demands.'86 Then, due to the
high level of transmission,'87 when major transmission line
contacted a tree, the line shut down. 8 As concluded in the
subsequent FERC investigation, if the tree vegetation
around the transmission line had been sufficiently main-
tained, the blackout may have been prevented, and almost
certainly would not have been as extensive.'89 The blackout
caused an estimated $5 billion in damage.19 °
183. GAO: LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 155, at 31-32.
184. See U.S.-CANADA POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, INTERIM REPORT:
CAUSES OF THE AUGUST 14TH BLACKOUT IN THE U.S. AND CANADA 23 (Nov.; 2003).
185. Id. at 21-27. NERC has developed a system to ensure reliability
throughout the National Grid based on a number of factors, including:
balancing of generation and demand, monitoring of energy transmission,
establish contingencies and arrange for emergency responses. . at 4-5.
186. Id. at 27-28.
187. When the transmission lines experience excessive capacity, they heat
up and sag. During the summer, contact between transmission lines and trees
is more likely, as trees grow faster and temperatures are higher. Id. at 36-37.
188. Id. at 28.
189. See generally FERC, Utility Vegetation Management Final Report
(Mar. 2004).
190. Thomas Eisenmann & R. Matthew Willis, Blackout: August 14, 2003
(Harvard Bus. Sch. June 28, 2004).
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The August 2003 blackout reveals the condition of the
competitive electricity market. Among other points, the
blackout emphasizes the fact that the U.S. electricity mar-
ket is in a state of flux, with each region having different
rules and structures.191 Further, an examination of the way
in which the centralized operational failures in Ohio
affected electricity service throughout the Northeast ex-
poses the increased risk in a deregulated structure. 192 Addi-
tionally, it demonstrates how the negligent acts of an entity
wholly unrelated, by contract or otherwise, to the customer
may adversely affect that customer's interests without any
liability. The actions of FirstEnergy in Ohio directly
resulted in the power failure to customers in the northeast.
However, because of the liability protections in place,
FirstEnergy did not have any concern for the consequences
in neighboring states. In fact, a FirstEnergy executive re-
marked, "We take exception to the idea that you should
interrupt local customers in favor of long-distance transac-
tions."' The August 2003 blackout indicates that
lawmakers should "approve new laws requiring mandatory
operating standards for the country's utilities as well as
penalties for companies that fail to comply with them."'94 It
remains to be seen how courts will address the issue in
pending litigation.
III. ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION
As the electricity market continues to become more
competitive, the underlying rationale for a limitation of
liability deteriorates. Electric utilities that continue to
operate as regulated entities would be necessarily exempt
from this analysis. After all, assuming that the original
rationale applied by the New York Public Service Commis-
sion was appropriate and valid, it remains valid and effec-
tive for the regulated electric utilities. The introduction of
191. See GAO, GAO-04-204, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: 2003 BLACKOUT
IDENTIFIES CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR (Nov. 18,
2003).
192. In particular, the lack of oversight pertaining to reliability monitoring
exposes consumers to a heightened risk. Id. at 24.
193. See Richard Prez-Pefia, Utility Could Have Halted '03 Blackout, Panel
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, at A16
194. Editorial, Lessons From a Blackout, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004, at A22.
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competitive entities does not affect the utilities' relationship
to their customers and, therefore, their own liability.
Furthermore, provisions exempting electric companies for
damages resulting from force majeure are valid on their
face.19 On the other hand, unregulated electric companies
that benefit from the competitive market structure present
the question of whether liability limitations are appropriate
for them.
In a fully competitive modern electricity market, there
will be little distinction between the contractual relation-
ship of the electric company and the consumer and the rela-
tionship between those parties at the turn of the twentieth
century. The relationship between the customer and the
electric company will be one of contract, typically entered
into through an electric service company ("ESCO") or
equivalent third party. The question then arises whether a
court should enforce a limitation of liability clause in that
private contract. As seen above,196 unregulated electric
companies originally were granted limitation of liability
protection as a form of bargained-for contract exchange.
However, as states began to regulate the those companies,
the rationale rested on the utility's potentially excessive
liability and the restrictive nature of the regulations.197
In the current competitive environment, there are three
contractual relationships that can exist between a con-
sumer and the electricity provider. First, the customer can
choose to remain within the confines of traditional utility
service. In this arrangement, the customer continues to pay
a regulated utility rate for his electricity, and the utility
continues to enjoy the protection of the limitation of liabil-
ity.
The second and third relationships are analytically
identical. First, the utility can act as an independent gen-
erator and provide its customers with a competitive rate
through an ESCO or other entity. Second, the customer can
contract directly with an ESCO to find service for him. This
195. Force majeure and acts of God do not provide an injured party with any
legal recourse, since, by definition, no party is responsible for the consequences
of the event. Nonetheless, as seen in the Food Pageant case, the electric utility's
response to an act of God can carry liability. See discussion supra, Part I(B)(4).
196. See discussion supra, Part I(A) & (B)(1).
197. See discussion supra, Part I(B)(3).
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relationship is legally indistinguishable to that of a utility
serving a customer through the competitive market. In this
structure, the utility has removed its consideration (the
utility rate) for the limitation of liability provisions. The
contractual basis for the limitation of liability fails for lack
of consideration; the customer is entitled to demand more
from the utility. The situation is distinct from the regulated
utility structure, whereby the governing PSC represented
the customer's interests.' One may argue that the decrease
in the customer's cost is consideration for the continued
limitation of liability. However, such an argument would
distort the actual effect of a competitive structure.
In a competitive system, the customer assumes liability
for fluctuations, both high and low, in market prices. Thus,
the customer has provided the electricity provider with
consideration for the promise of lower prices. Additionally,
the electricity provider benefits from the customer's deci-
sion to choose a competitive provider-the customer
surrenders his right to a regulated utility rate in return for
a potentially lower rate. Therefore, the electricity provider
has not provided any renewed consideration for the limita-
tion of liability. Moreover, the market-based structure evis-
cerates the original theory from Esteve Bros., namely, that
the limitation of liability provision was inherent in the
rate. 199
Assuming that Esteve Bros. is correct, that the limita-
tion of liability provision was inherent in the regulated rate,
then the addition of liability onto a market-based rate will
not affect the efficiency of the rate. Rather, it will act only
to bring the market-based rate closer to the utility rate. The
regulated utility rate was fair and reasonable because it
reflected the cost of service.
The restrictive nature of the utility structure on electric
companies is no longer apparent. Assuming that electric
utilities have to protect themselves for their negligent
interruptions of service through insurance or otherwise,
their rates would not be affected necessarily in the manner
198. Primrose v. W. Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1894) (holding that
providing a customer with a choice whether to impose liability through the rate
is reasonable); see supra note 8.
199. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 571 (1921) ("The
limitation of liability was an inherent part of the rate.").
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suggested by the New York PSC in 1938. That is to say, the
cost of liability would be factored into the basic cost of
service, rather than in addition to a fixed rate. Therefore,
the only effect that the imposition of liability would have
would be on the margin between the competitive rate and
the utility rate. The rate that the public pays would
increase, but only to reflect the cost of service. The addi-
tional liability to competitive electric companies would nar-
row the inequity between the continued regulation of
electric utilities and the accommodating treatment of com-
petitive entities. Moreover, the benefit of competition would
still be available: customers who opt for competitive service
would continue to receive more efficient rates.
During the initial assessment of the limitation of
liability provisions, rates governed the debate, but the na-
ture of the regulation imposed spurred their legitimacy. In
a deregulated system, the same imperatives do not exist.
The benefits of promoting a competitive system to the dis-
advantage of both consumers, who are compelled to assume
the risk, and utility companies, which lose their monopoly
status and do not have the same profit potential, do not
significantly outweigh the risks-questionable reliability
because of the "incentive" to be negligent. °0 The incentive to
be negligent is in the cost-saving possibilities. The electric
companies may subcontract parts of their services to mar-
ginally qualified operators, who are ill-prepared for a crisis
or emergency. Similarly, an electric company may find it
economically inefficient to adequately maintain vegetation
around its transmission lines with potentially catastrophic
results.0 1 In any event, the risk that a company will be
negligent is uncompensated by any consideration in the
competitive rate. As the electricity sector relies more upon
200. See Hearing Before the United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, 107th Congress (Oct. 10, 2001)
(prepared testimony of David N. Cook, General Counsel, NERC) ("NERC firmly
believes that steps must be taken now to ensure the continued reliability of the
electricity transmission system if the Nation is to reap the benefits of
comptetitive electricity markets."); see also discussion supra, Part I(D).
201. See FERC, Utility Vegetation Management Final Report (Dep't of
Energy, FERC Mar. 2004). Subsequent reports from the August 2003 blackout
indicate that it may have been prevented. See Associated Press, Power Industry
Faulted in Blackout Report: Investigators Warn of Repeat Without Regulations
(Apr. 5, 2004), at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4670888 (last visited Dec. 10,
2004) ("The [U.S.-Canadian task force] report makes clear that this blackout
could have been prevented .... ).
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financial and economic indicia, °2 ultimately, financial deci-
sions may determine operational ones.
The retail electricity market has changed radically in
the past two decades. Consequently, the reasoning that
governed the utility system has lost its applicability to the
competitive structure. As the national grid moves toward a
comprehensive competitive system, industry participants
should not continue to establish rules based on inapposite
rationales employed by utility regulators. The industry
must re-evaluate the motivations and the purposes behind
each aspect of the regulatory structure in order to compose
consistent rules to achieve the same results in the competi-
tive environment.
Among many other aspects, the limitation of liability
provisions in utility tariffs warrant a re-assessment in light
of the new competitive environment. Regardless of whether
the provisions are found to be appropriate, the industry
should not move to a competitive structure that maintains
the limitations established under the assumptions that
governed the regulated system without recognizing that the
forces that manage each system efficiently are necessarily
in conflict. Given that the underlying justification is inap-
plicable to the current system, the rationale for limiting
unregulated electric companies' liability for negligence can
no longer be viewed as absolutely valid. If the unregulated
industry cannot present a legitimate alternative rationale
consistent with the competitive structure, the limitation
acts only to increase customers' risk.
The primary structure of the electricity market has
changed, but the question remains: which components
should be adjusted and, more fundamentally, which compo-
nents should remain? The limitation of liability provisions,
established in regulated electric utility tariffs in the early
twentieth century, should be part of that consideration.
202. This will be necessitated by the dual structure of the competitive
market and its dependence on financial investments.
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